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"At some point, they're going to have to take stock and realize
this dog don't hunt."1
- Cheney spokeswoman Juleanna Glover Weiss
on the plaintiffs' case in Jones v. Bush.
I. INTRODUCTION
While the nation was enthralled by the Florida recount con-
troversy that culminated with the Supreme Court decision in
Bush v. Gore, another controversy involving the 2000 U.S. pres-
idential election was making its way through the Federal
courts. On November 9, 2000, Boca Raton attorney Lawrence
Caplan filed an action in U.S. District Court in Southern Flor-
ida seeking to enjoin the Secretary of State of the State of Texas
from certifying the slate of Texas Electors for Bush and Che-
ney.2 They claimed that both Governor George W. Bush and
Secretary Richard Cheney were "inhabitants" of the State of
Texas under the provision of the Twelfth Amendment, which
bars electors from casting their votes for candidates from the
same state.3 The issue had been brewing since the summer of
2000 when Secretary Cheney was selected by Governor Bush to
be the vice presidential nominee of the Republican Party. Todd
Gillmann, a journalist for the Dallas Morning News, observed
during the Republican National Convention that "[t]he Consti-
tution makes it tough for a president and vice president to come
from the same state."4 Caplan says that he filed this action in
response to the Florida recount controversy,5 although he has
insisted in interviews that his action was not partisan.6 Caplan
has said, "I voted for Ronald Reagan[,] I listen to Rush
Limbaugh[,J I'm a regular Democrat ... ."7 The case was subse-
1. Alan Clendenning, Vice Presidential Candidate Wins Residency Question at
Federal Appeals Court, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Dec. 7, 2000, http://www.
n... esidency&&news&newsflash-louisiana (on file with the Pace Law Review).
2. Angus M. Thuermer, Jr., Suit Challenges Cheney's Wyoming Residency,
JACKSON HOLE NEWS, Nov. 15, 2000, at 1, <http://www.jacksonholenews.com
Archives/NewsArchive/2000/001115-News.html>.
3. Id.
4. Robert Dennis, Cheney's Problem with the Constitution: The Illegal Ticket,
TomPaine.common sense (Aug. 28, 2000), at <http://www.tompaine.com/feature.
cfm/ID/3566>.
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quently dismissed by the Southern District of Florida for lack of
venue,8 re-filed and later dismissed by the Northern District of
Texas for lack of standing,9 and affirmed orally by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 10
The prohibition against electors casting both votes for can-
didates from the same state was initially adopted into Article II,
Section 1 of the Constitution at the Constitutional Convention.
Article II, Section 1 states:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may
be entitled in the Congress ....
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by
Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhab-
itant of the same State with themselves."
Prior to the 1804 presidential election, electors did not cast sep-
arate ballots for President and Vice President.12 The candidate
receiving the most votes was elected President and the runner
up, Vice President. 13 To differentiate between the party's
choices for each office, one elector was designated to cast an odd
vote so that the two candidates would not receive identical
totals.14 The latent difficulty with this provision came to the
fore in 1800 when the Democratic-Republican nominees dead-
locked. The Twelfth Amendment was subsequently adopted to
correct this defect, and, thereafter, electors have been required
to cast separate ballots for President and Vice President. 15
Amendment XII states:
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by bal-
lot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall
not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall
8. Caplan v. Bush, No. 00-9010-CIV-MOORE (S.D. Fla. November 20, 2000)
(order dismissing the complaint).
9. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
10. Jones v. Bush, 244 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2000).
11. U.S. CONST. art. II. § I, cl. 3 (superseded by U.S. CONST. amend. XII).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See NOBLE E. CUNNINGHAM, JR., IN PURSUIT OF REASON: THE LIFE OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 231 (1987).




name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President .... 16
The prohibition against casting electoral votes for candidates
from the same state was retained in the Amendment. 17
Although the District Court's decision with regards to the
definition of "inhabitant" in Jones v. Bush is not binding prece-
dent, it does call for an examination of the Twelfth Amend-
ment's meaning of "inhabitant" and the role of the Federal
judiciary in the certification process of electoral votes. The
court ruled that the term "inhabitant," as used in the Twelfth
Amendment, is coextensive with the legal doctrine of domicile
used in determining state residency for the purpose of estab-
lishing diversity jurisdiction in Federal courts.' 8 This interpre-
tation effectively swallows whole the requirement that both
candidates standing for election for President and Vice Presi-
dent be from different states. It also contravenes both the text
of the Twelfth Amendment, and the intentions of the Framers
to prevent two favorite sons of the same state from running to-
gether. Based upon the decision in Jones v. Bush, future presi-
dential candidates could reasonably read it to allow the
selection of running mates that may be clearly inhabitants of
the same state under the Twelfth Amendment, but cosmetically
change their residence in order to run for high office.
This Article seeks to: (II) examine the decision in Jones v.
Bush and its implications regarding the future of the Twelfth
Amendment's inhabitancy requirement, (III) examine the
meaning of the term "inhabitant" as intended by the Framers
and as it applies to the Cheney case, and (IV) argue that the
interpretation of the meaning of the term "inhabitant" in the
Twelfth Amendment is intended to be made by the United
States Congress in its capacity as the certifier of electoral votes,




18. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 719-20 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Selecting the President: How the Electoral College Works
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 considered a pleth-
ora of methods to select the chief executive. Among those meth-
ods of election considered by the Convention were: "selection by
Congress, by the governors of the states, by the state legisla-
tures, by a special group of Members of Congress chosen by lot,
and by direct popular election."19 Unable to resolve the issue
initially, it was referred to the Committee of Eleven on Post-
poned Matters, which came up with the electoral college system
as a compromise among the proposals. 20 The electoral college
was intended to reconcile the state and federal interests in se-
lecting the chief executive, provide some measure of popular
participation by the citizenry, ensure the less populous states
with a voice, and, most of all, preserve the presidency's indepen-
dence from the legislature. 21
The selection of the President through the electoral college
is a two-tier system. Generally, the public votes in popular elec-
tions for presidential electors who in turn select the chief execu-
tive. The voter casts his or her vote for a single slate of electors,
nominated by the political parties in each state, with the slate
that receives the most popular votes going to the electoral col-
lege.22 Maine and Nebraska use the district system where two
electors are chosen on an at-large basis, and one is selected for
each congressional district.23 Although election by popular vote
is the method used throughout the nation today, it is not re-
quired under the Constitution. The Constitution merely re-
quires electors to be chosen "in such [M]anner as the [State]
Legislature thereof may direct."24
19. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 106TH CONG., CRS REPORT FOR
CONGRESS, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE: How IT WORKS IN CONTEMPORARY PRESIDEN-
TIAL ELECTIONS 2 (Thomas H. Neale 1999), http://freedom.house.gov/electoral/crs-
ec.asp [hereinafter ELECTORAL COLLEGE].
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id. at 2.
22. Id. at 1.
23. Id.




The Constitution assigns each state a number of electors
equal to its combined representation to Congress.25 Currently
there are 538 total electors. A majority, 270 votes, is needed to
elect the President and Vice President respectively. 26 Any citi-
zen may be appointed an elector except Members of Congress
and individuals holding offices of "Trust or Profit" under the
Constitution.27
Electors assemble in their respective states on the Monday
after the second Wednesday in December. 2 They are pledged to
a single candidate, however, in most states they are not legally
required to vote for those candidates. 29 The electors cast sepa-
rate ballots for President and Vice President as provided for
under the provisions of the Twelfth Amendment. 30 An elector is
prohibited from casting both votes for presidential and vice
presidential candidates when both are "inhabitants" of his or
her state.31
Sometimes disputes arise over the validity of electoral votes
cast. Congress, through the 1887 election laws, has attempted
to place the settlement of all controversies with the state.3 2 The
governor of the state is required to certify the electoral votes "as
soon as practicable" after the final assessment of who have been
selected to serve as electors, or after a controversy has been set-
tled under the state's statutory procedures. 33
The electoral votes are certified at a joint session of Con-
gress on January 6th of the year succeeding the election. 34 In
years where January 6th falls on a Sunday, Congress has in the
25. Id.
26. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, supra note 19, at 1.
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
28. 3 U.S.C. § 7 (2002).
29. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952) ("Where a state authorizes a
party to choose its nominees for elector in a party primary and to fix the qualifica-
tions for the candidates, we see no federal constitutional objection to the require-
ment of this pledge.").
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
31. Id.
32. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 107TH CONG., MEMORANDUM, OVER-
VIEW OF ELECTORAL COLLEGE PROCEDURE AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 1-2 (Stanley
Bach and Jack Maskell, 2000), http://freedom.house.gov/electoral/crsmemo.asp
[herinafter MEMORANDUM]. See also, 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2002).
33. MEMORANDUM, supra note 32, at 2; see also 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2002).
34. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (2002).
218 [Vol. 23:213
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past changed the date. 35 A concurrent resolution, which incor-
porates by reference the applicable provisions of the United
States Code, for a joint session of Congress, originating in the
Senate, is passed in order for both Chambers to meet to count
the electoral votes.36 The procedures set forth in those provi-
sions of the Code constitute a joint rule of the two Houses for
the occasion, and govern the procedures used by both Houses in
the event they divide to consider an objection to the validity of
an electoral voteA7 The Vice President presides over the joint
session in his or her capacity as President of the Senate.38 The
certificates for the electoral votes are opened in alphabetical or-
der, passed to four tellers, two chosen by each chamber, who
announce the results. 39 The votes are then counted with the re-
sult announced by the President of the Senate.40
Should no candidate receive a majority of the electoral
votes cast, the House of Representatives chooses the President
in a contingent election; the Senate chooses the Vice Presi-
dent.41 The newly elected Congress conducts the election. 42 In
the House of Representatives, the President is selected from the
top three vote getters in the electoral college with each state
delegation casting a single vote.43
An internal poll is taken by each delegation.44 If no single
candidate receives a majority of the votes cast within the dele-
gation then that state's vote is counted as "divided," and, subse-
quently, barred from that round of voting. 45 This is what
occurred in 1825, although, this process was explicitly adopted
by Congress as non-binding precedent. 46 A simple majority of
35. ELECTORAL COLLEGE, supra note 19, at 6 n.9.
36. LEWIS DESCHLER, 3 DESCHLER'S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ch. 10, § 2 (1974).
37. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
38. Id. See also U.S.CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.
39. 3 U.S.C. § 15.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
42. THOMAS H. NEALE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 106TH CONG., CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT BY CON-
GRESS: CONTINGENT ELECTION 1 (1999) [herinafter CONTINGENT ELECTION].







votes taken by the delegations is needed to win the
presidency.47
The Senate in turn selects from among the top two vote get-
ters in the electoral college for Vice President.48 Each senator
casts a single vote with a simple majority needed to win.49
What is notable about this process is that it is placed entirely in
the hands of the state legislature to appoint the electors by any
manner of their choosing, for the governor of the state to certify
the slate of electors, and for Congress to count the votes and
resolve any and all disputes.
B. The Twelfth Amendment
The Twelfth Amendment was ratified in 1804 in order to
address some of the problems associated with the 1796 and
1800 presidential elections. In 1796, Thomas Jefferson was
elected to the vice presidency as a member of the opposition Re-
publican Party, while Vice President John Adams ascended to
the presidency as a member of the Federalist majority. The
Framers had not contemplated political parties when drafting
Article II. The votes in the electoral college were John Adams
with 71 electoral votes, Thomas Jefferson with 68, Thomas
Pinckney with 59, and Aaron Burr with 30.50 As Vice President,
Jefferson was able to organize the Republicans' electoral victory
four years later.
The more serious Constitutional crisis occurred in the elec-
tion of 1800. Pursuant to Article II, Section 1, electors did not
vote separately for President and Vice President. The electors
would cast both votes in favor of the candidates to whom they
were pledged. The political parties would then make arrange-
ments for at least one elector to cast their vote for another can-
didate in order to avoid a tie.51 For example, the Federalists in
1800 arranged for one of their electors to cast a vote for John
Jay, the governor of New York.52 The Republicans had failed to
make a similar arrangement in 1800 with each state believing
47. CONTINGENT ELECTION, supra note 42, at 1.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, at 203-04.
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that it would be the duty of another to cast the lone vote.5 3 As a
result, the electoral college voted 73 for Thomas Jefferson, 73
for Aaron Burr, 65 for John Adams, 64 for Thomas Pinckney,
and 1 for John Jay.5 4 It therefore ended in a deadlock between
Jefferson and Burr that sent the decision to the House of Repre-
sentatives. 5 The House that would be deliberating the choice
for the next President was not the incoming Chamber, which
was majority Republican, but the extant Federalist House.56
There was a great deal of concern about Federalist mischief
making including the possibility of not having a President-elect
by the time of the inauguration.57 The latter fears were put to
rest when the House agreed on February 9, 1801 that they
would go into continuous session until a new President was cho-
sen. 58 On February 17, after much deliberating and with some
help from his old adversary Alexander Hamilton, Thomas Jef-
ferson was elected, on the 36th ballot, President of the United
States.59 The Twelfth Amendment was ratified four years later,
and included an explicit provision that electors would cast sepa-
rate ballots for President and Vice President. 60 To also aid in
avoiding deadlocks in the future, the Amendment retained Arti-
cle II, Section 1's disincentive for two candidates from the same
state to run on the same ticket for fear of forfeiting their state's
electoral votes.
C. Bush v. Caplan: The Beginning
On November 9, 2000, Lawrence Caplan, a Boca Raton,
Florida attorney, filed an action in the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of Florida, before Judge E. Michael
Moore, seeking to enjoin the Secretary of State of Texas from
certifying the electoral votes of the State of Texas in favor of
Governor George W. Bush and Secretary Richard Cheney, the
respective winners of that state's popular vote for President and
Vice President, on the grounds that to do so would violate the
53. Id.
54. Id. at 230-31.
55. CUNNINGHAM, supra note 14, at 231.
56. Id. at 232.
57. Id. at 233-34.
58. Id at 235.
59. Id.




Twelfth Amendment.61 Caplan alleged that Bush and Cheney
were both inhabitants of the State of Texas, as conceived by the
Twelfth Amendment, as of November 7, 2000, the date of the
presidential election. 62 During the election, Cheney claimed
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, where he had served six terms as Wyo-
ming's lone Representative to the U.S. House, as his place of
residence.63 On July 21, 2000, prior to being selected as Gover-
nor Bush's running mate, Cheney changed his voter registra-
tion to Teton County, Wyoming, where he and his wife owned a
home since 1993.64 Caplan rejected Cheney's claim of inhabi-
tancy in Wyoming as "extremely undemocratic and something
that would go on in Haiti."65
In his complaint, the plaintiff initially named as defend-
ants: George W. Bush, Richard Cheney, and the Electors of the
State of Texas.66 The Texas Secretary of State was subse-
quently added as a defendant in an amended complaint filed on
the same day.67 In the amended complaint, plaintiff sought a
declaration
that both George Bush and Richard Cheney were "inhabitants" of
the state of Texas at the time of the election, and . . . are not
entitled to receive the thirty-two (32) electoral votes of the state of
Texas .... Furthermore, Petitioner asks this Court to issue a
permanent injunction preventing the Secretary of State of the
State of Texas from certifying its slate of electors in favor of
George Bush and Richard Cheney .... 68
After an initial determination by the court that venue was im-
proper, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint naming Vice
President Albert Gore as a defendant in his capacity as Presi-
61. Complaint, Caplan v. Bush, No. 00-9010-CIV-MOORE (S.D. Fla. filed
Nov. 9, 2000).
62. Id. at 2.
63. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 720 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
64. Id.
65. Theurmer, supra note 2.
66. Complaint at 1, Caplan v. Bush, No. 00-9010-CIV-MOORE (S.D. Fla. filed
Nov. 9, 2000).
67. Amended Complaint at 1, Caplan v. Bush, No. 00-9010-CIV-MOORE (S.D.
Fla. filed Nov. 9, 2000).
68. Id. at 7.
222 [Vol. 23:213
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dent of the United States Senate and "certifier of the Electoral
Votes of the United States."69
The court concluded that venue was improper in the ac-
tion.70 Although Vice President Gore was added as a defendant,
the court noted that no relief was sought from him, and that his
addition as a co-defendant could only serve as a means to cir-
cumvent the venue requirements. 71 The case was thereafter
dismissed on November 20, 2000 without prejudice.7 2 The case
against Bush and Cheney was then re-filed in the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas on the same day that the Florida district court
issued its order of dismissal.73
D. Jones v. Bush: The Decision by the U.S. District Court
On November 20, 2000, a second civil action was filed in the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas by three
Texas residents, Stephen E. Jones, Linda D. Lydia, and Caro-
line Franco, all of whom were registered Texas voters and had
voted in the November elections.7 4 The action sought to enjoin
the Texas Electors from casting their votes for both Governor
George W. Bush and Secretary Richard Cheney on December
18, 2000, when the electors were to meet in Austin, because
both candidates were allegedly "inhabitants" of the State of
Texas. 75 The plaintiffs presented a detailed list of Secretary
Cheney's activities regarding his residential status in support of
their argument. First, Secretary Cheney owned a home in
Highland Park (an affluent suburb of Dallas) for the five years
prior to seeking the vice-presidency, and he neither put his resi-
dence up for sale (until November 16, 2000, after the election),
nor did he make any overt act of abandonment of the prem-
ises. 76 Cheney paid local real estate taxes, voted in Precinct
69. Second Amended Complaint at 1, Caplan v. Bush, No. 00-9010-CIV-
MOORE (S.D. Fla. Filed November 20, 2000).
70. Caplan v. Bush, No. 00-9010 CIV-MOORE (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2000) (order
dismissing action for iinproper venue).
71. Id. at 3-4.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Complaint at 1, Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (No.
300 CV-2543D).
74. Id at 1.
75. Id. at 1,3.




1227, was president and CEO of Haliburton Corporation in Dal-
las, held a Texas driver's license, filed Federal income taxes list-
ing himself as a Texas resident, did not pay income taxes to
another state, received his mail at his Dallas address, listed his
Dallas address on his Federal Election Commission forms when
donating money to the nascent Bush for President campaign,
listed his Dallas address on the annual report for Brown & Root
Holdings, Inc. and other official corporate records, was treated
by Texas doctors for his health, did his banking in Dallas, and
availed himself of the Texas homestead exemption. 77 The plain-
tiffs contended that the only measure Secretary Cheney under-
took to support the Constitutional requirement that the
presidential and vice presidential candidates be from separate
states was that he flew on July 20, 2000 to Wyoming to change
his voter registration from Texas to Wyoming. 78 He did this ap-
parently without informing the Bush campaign according to
campaign director Karen Hughes. 79 Governor Bush's status as
an inhabitant of Texas for Twelfth Amendment purposes was
not disputed.80
The court dismissed the case on the grounds that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing to bring suit.8 ' To satisfy the standing re-
quirement of Article III of the Constitution, "plaintiffs must
show, at an 'irreducible constitutional minimum,' that they
have 'suffered injury in fact,' that the injury is 'fairly traceable'
to the actions of the defendant[s], and that the injury will likely
be addressed by a favorable decision."8 2 If the Constitutional re-
quirements are met, "the court's exercise of jurisdiction must
also satisfy the 'prudential considerations that are part of judi-
cial self-government.'"8 3 The plaintiffs argued that the harm
they would suffer would be a violation of their rights under the
Constitution by the denial of casting a "meaningful vote."84 For
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Complaint at 5, Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (No.
300 CV-2543D).
79. Terry M. Neal, GOP Hails Cheney's Inclusion on Ticket, Democrats Pre-
pare to Fight 'Big Oil', WASH. POST, July 26, 2000, at Al.
80. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715 n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
81. Id. at 715.
82. Id. at 716 (alteration in original) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154,
162 (1997) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992))).
83. Id. at 716 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
84. Id. at 716.
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Article III purposes, "an injury in fact must be 'concrete... and
actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"'8 5 and it
must "'affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way."'8 6
The court ruled that the plaintiffs would not suffer any personal
or irreparable harm, noting that the Supreme Court has held
that "[a] general interest in seeing that the government abides
by the Constitution is not sufficiently individuated or palpable
to constitute such an injury."8 7 Plaintiffs, citing Anderson v. Cel-
ebrezze, Bullock v. Carter, and Henderson v. Fort Worth Inde-
pendent School District, also asserted a right to litigate the
issue on behalf of the interests of the Democratic ticket.88 The
court denied this as well on the grounds that the cited cases
only "recognize that voters may have an independent interest
... that may be harmed by the same action that adversely af-
fects the candidate."8 9
In the interest of appellate review, the court went on to ad-
dress the merits of the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunc-
tion by holding that the term "inhabitant" under the Twelfth
Amendment is coextensive with the legal concept of "domicili-
ary."90 Thus, Secretary Richard Cheney was not an inhabitant
of Texas for purposes of the Texas Electors' ability to cast both
ballots for him and Bush.9 1 In interpreting the term "inhabi-
tant," as used in the Twelfth Amendment, the court relied upon
definitions found in dictionaries contemporary with the Fram-
ers.9 2 A 1792 law dictionary defined "inhabitant" as:
with respect to the public assessments, and the like, [inhabitants]
are not only those who dwell in an house there, but also those who
85. Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
86. Id. at 715 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).
87. Id. at 717 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984)) ("This Court
has repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in accor-
dance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal
court.").
88. Id. at 717 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Henderson v. Fort Worth Indep. School Dist., 526 F.2d
286 (5th Cir. 1976)).
89. Id.
90. Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d. at 719-20.
91. Id.at 721.
92. Id. at 719 (In support of this proposition, the court cited United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (using contemporary





occupy lands within such town or parish, although they be dwell-
ing elsewhere. But the word inhabitants doth not extend to lodg-
ers, servants, or the like; but to householders only.93
Webster's in 1828 defined "inhabitant" as a "dweller, one who
dwells or resides permanently in a place or who has a fixed resi-
dence, as distinguished from an occasional lodger or visitor ....
One who has a legal settlement in a town, city or parish."94 The
court equated these two definitions with the modem legal con-
cept of domiciliary. 95 A domicile is "'established by physical
presence in a place in connection with a certain state of mind
concerning one's intent to remain there.' "96 Thus, the court held
that the test for "inhabitant" under the Twelfth Amendment
parallels the test for domiciliary: (1) the individual possesses a
physical presence in the state, (2) with the intent to remain
indefinitely.97
In determining an individual's domicile, the court should
"'look to all evidence [of] ... [the] litigant's intention[s] ... [in-
cluding] the places where the litigant exercises civil and politi-
cal rights, pays taxes, owns real and personal property, has
driver's and other licenses, maintains bank accounts, belongs to
clubs and churches, has places of business or employment, and
maintains a home for his family.'" 98 The court ruled that Che-
ney had both a physical presence in Wyoming with the neces-
sary intent to remain there indefinitely.99 The key factors in
the court's conclusion were the facts that Cheney was "born,
raised, educated, and married in Wyoming," and served for six
terms in the U.S. House of Representatives as the Member from
Wyoming. 100 According to the Qualification Clauses to the Con-
93. Id. at 719 (quoting RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, LAW DICTIONARY (1792)).
94. Id. at 719 (alteration in original) (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN Dic-
TIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Facsimile Edition by Foundation for Ameri-
can Christian Education 5th ed. 1828, 1967, 1987) (not paginated), quoted in
Charles Wood, Losing Control of America's Future: The Census, Birthright Citi-
zenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 465, 478 (1999)).
95. Jones, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 719.
96. Id. at 719 (quoting Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S.
30, 48 (1989)).
97. Id. at 719-20.
98. Id. at 720 (quoting Coury v. Prot, 85 F.3d 244, 250 (5th Cir. 1996) (used
these factors to determine if a Texas citizen was domiciled in France)).
99. Id.
100. Jones, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 720.
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stitution found in Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 and Article I,
Section 3, Clause 3, a Member of Congress is deemed an inhabi-
tant of the state from which he or she has been elected. 01
In New Orleans, Judges Patrick E. Higginbotham, Rhesa
H. Barksdale and Jacques L. Wiener, Jr. of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, after an hour long oral argument followed by
a short recess, unanimously agreed that Cheney was a Wyo-
ming resident, and affirmed the District Court's decision with-
out further elaboration. 0 2
III. TOWARD A DEFINITION OF INHABITANT
A. What "Inhabitant" Means
The decision in Jones v. Bush presents a definition of "in-
habitant" that is both contrary to the text of the Constitution
and the intent of the Framers. The court's reasoning renders
the inhabitancy provision a nullity. It may also lead to confu-
sion in future elections where presidential nominees may rely
upon it when deliberating upon whom to select as a running
mate. A further examination of the term "inhabitant" reveals a
different meaning than that found by the court in Jones v.
Bush. An "inhabitant" under the plain meaning of the text is an
individual who physically dwells in a place or owns real prop-
erty therein. The laws of a state with regards to legal residency
and state citizenship are inapplicable to the Twelfth Amend-
ment. The term "inhabitant" is also incongruent with the terms
"domicile" and "resident" as they are used in civil procedure. In
deliberating upon which state a candidate may be considered an
"inhabitant," where the candidate possesses more than one resi-
dence thus obfuscating the plain meaning as a sole determining
factor, one should examine the multiple residences in light of
the intent of the Framers in order to derive the appropriate
place of inhabitancy.
1. The Plain Meaning of The Text
Generally, the methodology for determining the meaning of
a word or phrase in a constitutional provision is the intent of
101. Id. at 721.




the Framers derived from the unambiguous language of the
text.10 3 The Supreme Court has stated:
The object of construction, applied to a constitution, is to give ef-
fect to the intent of its framers, and of the people in adopting it.
This intent is to be found in the instrument itself; and when the
text of a constitutional provision is not ambiguous, the courts, in
giving construction thereto, are not at liberty to search for its
meaning beyond the instrument. 10 4
At the textual level, the term "inhabitant" is synonymous with
resident. Webster's Dictionary defines an "inhabitant" as "[a]
resident." 05 Black's Law Dictionary in turn defines a "resident"
as "[a] person who has residence in a particular place."10 6 "Resi-
dence" itself is defined as "[t]he act or fact of living in a given
place for some time."'10 7
The term "inhabitant" also denotes some measure of per-
manence to the area. Specifically, ownership of property may
support a claim of inhabitancy. 08 This is because the term "in-
habitant" is defined to "'not extend to lodgers, servants, or the
like; but to households only." ' 10 9 The property owner may also
be an inhabitant of that area without it being his or her primary
place of residence. 10 Utilizing a definition used by the court in
Jones v. Bush from a 1792 law dictionary, an inhabitant may
include "'those who occupy lands within such town or parish,
although they be dwelling elsewhere."""' Moreover, the Fram-
ers used the term "inhabitant" because it "would not exclude
persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or
private business."'1 2 Thus, an "inhabitant" in terms of the plain
103. Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889).
104. Id.
105. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 570 (2d ed.1995).
106. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (7th ed. 1999).
107. Id. at 1310.
108. For purposes of this discussion, I am also including leasing of property as
part of the ownership of property concept.
109. Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713, 719 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (quoting RICH-
ARD BURN & JOHN BURN, LAW DICTIONARY (1792)).
110. Id. at 719.
111. Id. (quoting RICHARD BURN & JOHN BURN, LAW DICTIONARY (1792)).
112. Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1036 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. de-
nied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 216 (Max Farrand Ed. 1911), reprinted in 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION
71 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner Eds., 1987)).
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meaning of the text is one who physically dwells in a place or
owns real property therein.
However, when the plain meaning of "inhabitant" is ap-
plied to the Twelfth Amendment in terms of the concepts of
state residency, domiciliary and residency, as the latter two are
defined in civil procedure, it contravenes both the text and its
underlying intent. The term "inhabitant" can neither be inter-
preted to mean legal residency under state law, nor can the
term be coextensive with domiciliary or residency. Black's Law
Dictionary states that "[a] resident is not necessarily either a
citizen or a domiciliary." 113
2. State Citizenship
First, "inhabitant" cannot be coextensive with the concept
of citizenship or legal residency under state law as the plaintiffs
in Jones v. Bush suggest.1 4 The Framers purposefully used the
term "inhabitant" in the Twelfth Amendment and in Article I on
the requirements for standing for election to the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Senate, in place of the term "citizen."115
There is nothing to suggest that "inhabitant" means something
altogether different in the Twelfth Amendment than it does in
Article I. What constitutes citizenship in a state (i.e. legal resi-
dency) is different from what it means to be an inhabitant of a
state. A closer examination of how these terms are used in the
Constitution will illustrate this point. The Privileges and Im-
munities Clause, Article IV, section 2, provides: "The Citizens of
each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens of the several States."1" 6
This provision removes "from the citizens of each State the
disabilities of alienage in the other States.""17 The Clause
113. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (7th ed. 1999).
114. Complaint at 8, Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000) (No.
300 CV-2543D).
115. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S. CONST. amend.
XII.
116. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
117. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1869) ("[W]ithout some provision ...
removing from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other
States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Re-
public would have constituted little more than a league of States; it would not have




grants recently arrived residents of a state, and visiting citizens
of another state the same rights as those of existing citizens.
However, the protections of the Clause are not absolute as "it
does bar discrimination against citizens of other States where
there is no substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the
mere fact that they are citizens of other States. But it does not
preclude disparity of treatment in the many situations where
there are perfectly valid independent reasons for it."118 The
purpose behind the Privileges and Immunities Clause "was to
help fuse into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign
States."119 It reflects the idea that citizens of the United States
"have two political capacities, one state and one federal" each
co-equal with the other. 120 By creating uniformity of the rights
of citizens under both Federal law and state law, the Constitu-
tion recognizes that the two are merged into a single nation. 121
In contrast to the Privileges and Immunities Clause, Arti-
cle I, Section 2, on the requirements for election to the House of
Representatives, states: "No Person shall be a Representative
who shall not have.., been seven Years a Citizen of the United
States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of
that State in which he shall be chosen."122 On the requirements
for election to the Senate, Article II, section 3, similarly states:
"No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have.., been nine
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be cho-
sen." 23 The Twelfth Amendment, as well as Article II, Section
1, which it supersedes, also uses the term "inhabitant" instead
of "citizen." The term "inhabitant" is less restrictive than
"citizen."
While the privileges of "citizens" throughout the Union
were made equal under the Constitution, the criteria of state
citizenship were omitted in terms of standing for public office.
When standing for Federal office, one is seeking election in his
or her capacity as a citizen of the United States, not as a citizen
118. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
119. Id. at 395.
120. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 504 (1999); see also ELECTORAL COLLEGE,
supra note 19.
121. Paul, 75 U.S. at 176.
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, c. 3.
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of the state in question. If the requirement read "citizen" of a
state rather than "inhabitant," state law would, in effect, govern
the election of federal office holders as the candidate would first
have to qualify as a citizen of the state. An individual under
such circumstances could effectively be barred from seeking fed-
eral office as he or she is seeking to establish state citizenship.
To prevent this outcome, the Framers used the term "inhabi-
tant" in lieu of "citizen." To be an "inhabitant" of the state, an
individual merely must reside there or own property. This is
consistent with the intent behind the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause in which one is availed to all rights under federal
citizenship as well as state citizenship. One is free to stand for
federal public office at any time, leading to the establishment of
a truly national legislative body independent from, yet co-equal
with, the state legislatures.
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a state
cannot promulgate additional restrictions upon the eligibility of
candidates for federal office outside of those enumerated in Ar-
ticle II. In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court struck
down "an amendment to the Arkansas State Constitution that
prohibit[ed] the name of an otherwise-eligible candidate for
Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if that
candidate ha[d] already served three terms in the House of Rep-
resentatives or two terms in the Senate."' 24 The Court held that
"[aillowing individual States to adopt their own qualifications
for congressional service would be inconsistent with the Fram-
ers' vision of a uniform National Legislature representing the
people of the United States" as a whole. 125 The Court reasoned
that "[tihe Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclu-
sive source of qualifications for Members of Congress, and that
the Framers thereby 'divested' States of any power to add quali-
fications." 126 The majority emphasized that "[t]he Congress of
the United States ... is not a confederation of nations in which
separate sovereigns are represented by appointed delegates, but
is instead a body composed of representatives of the people."127
124. U.S. Term Limits v. Thorton, 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 800-01.




The holding of the Court is consistent with the proclama-
tions of the Framers on this subject. James Madison reasoned,
"A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy
as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the
number authorised to elect."128 He emphasized this point by cit-
ing the British Parliament's attempts to regulate qualifications.
Madison observed that "the abuse they had made of it was a
lesson worthy of our attention."1 29 Hugh Williamson expressed
concern at the Constitutional Convention that if a majority of
the legislature should happen to be "composed of any particular
description of men, of lawyers for example, . . the future elec-
tions might be secured to their own body."130 In addition, Alex-
ander Hamilton wrote:
The truth is that there is no method of securing to the rich the
preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of prop-
erty either for those who may elect, or be elected. But this forms
no part of the power to be conferred upon the national govern-
ment .... [T]he qualifications of the persons who may choose or
be chosen, as has been remarked upon another occasion, are de-
fined and fixed in the Constitution; and are unalterable by the
legislature. 131
Justice Story commented on the ability of state legislatures to
set additional requirements to stand for federal office:
[I]t would seem but fair reasoning upon the plainest principles of
interpretation, that when the constitution established certain
qualifications, as necessary for office, it meant to exclude all
others, as prerequisites. From the very nature of such a provi-
sion, the affirmation of these qualifications would seem to imply a
negative of all others.132
The reasoning behind the Framers' wording of the Qualifica-
tions Clause was similar to that behind using the term "inhabi-
tant" in lieu of "citizen" in order to form a national
representative branch of government uniting the separate, yet
128. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 250 (Max Far-
rand ed. 1911).
129. Id. at 250.
130. Id. at 250.
131. THE FEDERALIST No. 60, at 408-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Ros-
siter ed. 1961).
132. 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 625 (3d ed. 1858).
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sovereign, states into a single nation. This reasoning of the
Framers' behind the Qualifications Clause also applies to the
use of the term "inhabitant" with regards to electing the Presi-
dent and Vice President. By using the term "inhabitant" in lieu
of "citizen," the Framers assured that the states could not indi-
rectly add qualifications to candidates outside of those enumer-
ated in Article II by merely adding additional qualifications to
becoming a lawful citizen of the state.
Therefore, state residency requirements cannot be coexten-
sive with the term "inhabitant" in Articles I and II and in the
Twelfth Amendment. The requirements to establish legal resi-
dency in a given state, if applied to standing for federal office,
would effectively serve as additional requirements to those enu-
merated in Articles I and II. The Supreme Court has struck
down attempts by the states to set additional electoral require-
ments for standing for federal office. To read the inhabitancy
requirement in these terms leads to an outcome that has been
held unconstitutional and is contrary to the intentions of the
Framers with regards to national unity.
As previously discussed, one argument put forth in the
plaintiffs complaint in Jones v. Bush was that Secretary Che-
ney did not meet the requirements of legal residency in Wyo-
ming. The plaintiffs argued that changing his voter
registration from Texas to Wyoming only proved that Cheney
was not an "inhabitant" of Wyoming under the Twelfth Amend-
ment.133 Section 23-1-102(a)(ix), W.S. 2001 states:
"Resident" means a United States citizen who has been a resident
of Wyoming and domiciled in Wyoming for not less than one (1)
year and who has not claimed residency elsewhere for any pur-
pose during that one (1) year period immediately preceding the
date of application for a license, permit, or certificate.13
Furthermore, the Wyoming Election Code, Section 22-1-102 de-
fines "residence" as the place of one's actual habitation. 135
Under Wyoming State law, at the time of the election, Cheney
was likely not a legal resident of Wyoming. Cheney had previ-
ously been a legal resident of Wyoming, but for the five years
133. Complaint at 8-9, Jones v. Bush, 122 F. Supp. 2d 713 (N.D. Tex. 2000)
(No. 300 CV-2543D).
134. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-102(a)(ix) (Michie 2001).




prior to the election had availed himself to the rights and privi-
leges of Texas residency. Nevertheless, the status of citizenship
in a state (i.e. legal residency) is inapplicable in terms of the
Twelfth Amendment's application to running for federal office.
The term "inhabitant" cannot be read to mean "citizen" of a
state as used in the Constitution. Living in the state and own-
ing property are sufficient alone to denote inhabitancy. There-
fore, Cheney's status as either a legal resident of Texas or
Wyoming is irrelevant for purposes of ascertaining inhabitancy
under the Twelfth Amendment.
3. "Inhabitant" Is Not Coextensive With Domicile
Next, the term "inhabitant," as used in the Twelfth Amend-
ment, cannot be coextensive with the legal concept of "domicile."
To find that "inhabitant" is coextensive with domicile is to bring
in a subjective concept that would render the prohibition con-
tained in the Twelfth Amendment a nullity.
An individual's "domicile" is determined by physical pres-
ence in a particular state and the intent to make his or her
home there indefinitely. 136 A person can have one and only one
domicile at any moment in time, and the only way to lose
domicilliary status in one state is to gain such status in an-
other. 137 "[F]or purposes of diversity jurisdiction, a natural per-
son is considered to be a citizen of the state in which he or she is
domiciled." 138 In this context, "citizenship" is synonymous with
"domicile."1 39 "A person's domicile is the place where the person
has his or her true, fixed home and principal establishment,
and to which he or she has the intention of returning whenever
136. Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48 (1989) ("For
adults, domicile is established by physical presence in a place in connection with a
certain state of mind concerning one's intent to remain there.").
137. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914) ("The essential fact that
raises a change of abode to a change of domicil is the absence of any intention to
live elsewhere, . . . or, as Mr. Dicey puts it in his admirable book, 'the absence of
any present intention of not residing permanently or indefinitely in' the new
abode.") (citations omitted); Crowley v. Glaze, 710 F.2d 676, 678 (10th Cir. 1983)
("To effect a change in domicile, two things are indispensable: First, residence in a
new domicile, and second, the intention to remain there indefinitely.").
138. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 102.34[2]
(3d ed. 1999) (citing Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000)).
139. Galva Foundry Co. v. Heiden, 924 F.2d 729, 730 (7th Cir. 1991).
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absent."140 Domicile "has both a physical and a subjective com-
ponent, and is more than an individual's residence, although
the two typically coincide."' 4' "Citizenship is not necessarily
lost by protracted absence from home, if the intention to return
remains."142 "However, mere 'mental fixing' of citizenship,
without physical presence, is not sufficient to establish" a
domicile.' 43
"A person is deemed to have a domicile at all times," 44 al-
though, "[a]t any given time, a person has but one domicile." 145
"Once a domicile is established in one state, it is presumed to
continue in existence, even if the party leaves that state, until
the adoption of a new domicile is established."' 46 "The fact that
a person resides in a particular state is not, by itself, determina-
tive of citizenship for the purpose of federal court jurisdiction
because one can reside in one place but be domiciled in another
if the person intends to return to a prior residence.' 47
The determination of a person's domicile is a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact.148 "Questions as to a person's intent to
change or not change domicile from one state to another are fac-
tual questions."' 49 "No single factor is conclusive."'150 "In deter-
mining which of the person's residences is his or her domicile,
the court must focus on the intent of the party, which requires
an examination of the entire course of a person's conduct."' 51
"There is no durational, or minimum period of residence that is
140. 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET. AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 102.34[2]
(3d ed. 1999).
141. Id. (citing Nat'l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
142. Id.
143. Id. (citing Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954)).
144. Id. § 102.3412].
145. MOORE, supra note 140, § 102.34[2] (citing Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38,
42 (2d Cir. 2000)).
146. Id. § 102.3417]. (citing Anderson v. Watt, 138 U.S. 694, 706 (1891)).
147. Id. § 102.34[8]. (citing Mas v. Perry, 489 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (5th Cir.
1974)).
148. Palazzo, 232 F.3d at 42.
149. MOORE, supra note 140, § 102.3414] (citing Palazzo, 232 F.3d at 42).
150. Id. (citing Nat'l Artists Mgmt. Co. v. Weaving, 769 F. Supp. 1224, 1228
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)).




required to establish domicile."15 2 "A person may change domi-
ciles only by taking up residence in a different state either with
the intention to remain there, or at least without any specific
intention to live anywhere else."1 53 "The intention and the act
must concur to effect the change of domicile." 154 "Neither the
physical presence nor the intention to change domicile, stand-
ing alone, is sufficient to effect the change."'155 There is no re-
quirement that the individual state an intention to remain
permanently, only that the individual state no intention to go
elsewhere. 156 "Motive in changing domiciles is irrelevant unless
it bears on the issue of intent." 57 All circumstances must be
evaluated in their entirety. 158 Some of the factors courts weigh
in determining an individual's intent are:
1. Voting registration and voting practices;
2. Place of employment or business;
3. Current residence;
4. Affidavits of intention;
5. Transfer requests;
6. Location of real property rented or owned;
7. Location of personal property (for example, furniture and
automobiles);
8. Location of spouse and family;
9. Driver's licenses;
10. Automobile registration;
11. Licenses other than driver's license;
12. Location of brokerage and bank accounts;
13. Payment of taxes;
14. Tax return addresses;
15. Membership in unions;
16. Location of religious organizations with which affiliated;
17. Location of fraternal organizations, clubs, and other social
associations;
18. Location of business and financial transactions;
152. Id. § 102.34[11 (citing White v. All Am. Cable & Radio, Inc., 642 F.
Supp. 69, 72 (D.P.R. 1986)).
153. Id. § 102.3511] (citing Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624 (1914)).
154. MOORE, supra note 140, § 102.35[1l (citing Palazzo, 232 F.3d at 42).
155. Id.
156. Hawes v. Club Ecuestre El Commandante, 598 F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir.
1979); Gallagher v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 185 F.2d 543, 546 (3d Cir. 1950).
157. MOORE, supra note 140, § 102.35[3] (citing Williamson, 232 U.S. at 625).




THAT DOG DON'T HUNT
19. Exercise of civil and political rights;
20. The location of a person's physician, lawyer, accountant, den-
tist, and stockbroker;
21. Payment of utilities;
22. Acquisition and listing of telephones;
23. Receipt of mail;
24. Membership in professional organizations;
25. Membership in civil organizations. 159
"The place where a person votes is a factor that perhaps may
carry more weight than other factors" under certain
circumstances. 160
If the conclusion of the court in Jones v. Bush is that the
term "inhabitant" is coextensive with domicilliary then that re-
quirement of the Twelfth Amendment which states that two
candidates must be from different states or cede their home
state's electoral votes has been voided for all practical purposes.
While the Framers by adopting the requirement of inhabitancy
instead of citizenship provided flexibility in changing one's
place of residence in terms of standing for public office, they
could not have intended for that criteria to be so subjective that
it could readily be avoided. Moreover, how could it reasonably
be suggested that the Framers intended the term "inhabitant"
to be defined by a legal concept not in existence at the time of
ratification? It is the subjective aspect of the latter criteria that
makes domicile so incompatible with the concept of inhabitancy
under the Twelfth Amendment.
4. "Inhabitant" Is Not Coextensive With "Resident"
Finally, while the plain meaning of "inhabitant" means
"resident," the term cannot be coextensive with the legal con-
cept of residency used in civil procedure. Residence is a broader
and more inclusive concept than domiciliary, reflecting the real-
ity that a person can live in more than one state at a given
time. 161 According to Black's Law Dictionary, "residence" "[usu-
ally] just means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
159. MOORE, supra note 140, § 102.36[1] (citations omitted).
160. Id. §102.36[3] (citing Lundquist, 946 F.2d at 12).
161. E.g., Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 48 ("'Domicile' is not necessarily synonymous
with 'residence,' and one can reside in one place but be domiciled in another.")




place [while] domicile [usually] requires bodily presence plus an
intention to make the place one's home."1 62 The problem that
arises in defining "inhabitant" as meaning residence alone is
that if an individual has more than one residence, then any
state in which he or she is resident may be construed as a place
of inhabitancy for purposes of the Twelfth Amendment. This
plainly leaves the requirement a mess as the candidate can pick
and choose his or her state of inhabitancy. Such a practice con-
travenes the intent of the provision. A candidate could clearly
be from one state for political purposes, such as serving as the
state's governor for example, and claim inhabitancy in a second
state where he or she owns real property for purposes of satisfy-
ing the Twelfth Amendment. This would allow two candidates
from the same state to run together contrary to the intentions of
the Framers. Therefore, the requirement that the candidates
for President and Vice President not be inhabitants of the same
state cannot be read to mean residency in a broad sense.
5. The Intent of the Framers
The electoral college was a compromise among the Framers
between having the chief executive selected by Congress or by
direct election. The Framers preferred this method to the other
proposed methods because they thought that it posed "little op-
portunity for cabal[] or corruption."163 Eldridge Gerry of Mas-
sachusetts feared that through direct election "[t]he ignorance
of the people would put it in the power of some one set of men
dispersed through the Union [and] acting in Concert to delude
them into any appointment."164
The electoral college itself posed two potential problems:
the disproportionate number of voters between the North and
South, and the probability that electors would cast their ballots
only for candidates from their state. 165 In other words, electors
would favor "favorite sons" when casting their ballots in the
electoral college. Webster's New College Dictionary defines a
favorite son as "[a] candidate favored by his own state delegates
162. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1310 (7th ed. 1999).
163. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 365 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) [hereinafter DEBATES].
164. Id. at 368.
165. Id. at 365.
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.... 166 One of the objectives behind the inhabitancy require-
ment was to prevent this tendency that could lead to the domi-
nation of the executive branch by a single state or small group
of states. Madison summed up the latter problem by observing
that it is "the disposition in the people to prefer a Citizen of
their own State .... "167
The electoral college as originally conceived did not provide
for a separate ballot for President and Vice President, and the
method of selection of electors was left to the state legisla-
tures.168 Thus, should the states be allowed unfettered to cast
both of their ballots for favorite sons it could lead to two possi-
ble problems: that larger states would come to dominate the ex-
ecutive by electing both the President and Vice President from
their state, and there lingered the possibility of a deadlock on
the first ballot if every state cast their votes for favorite sons. 169
The latter dilemma left open the possibility that the electoral
college could become a preliminary election with the House of
Representatives selecting the President and the Senate select-
ing the Vice President. The Framers explicitly intended for
election by Congress to merely serve as a contingency should
the electoral college fail to select the President and Vice Presi-
dent. They did not wish for the executive to be chosen by the
legislature which, they feared, would weaken its independency.
Therefore, by requiring divided votes from each state's slate of
electors, the threat of deadlocks in the electoral college as the
norm would be lessened, and the strength of larger states would
be slightly diminished. Thus, one of the aims was to break up
voting blocks by requiring that electors cast their ballots for
candidates from different states.
The term "inhabitant" cannot be defined solely in a broad
sense as resident or domicile when a candidate possesses resi-
dences in multiple states. To do so would contravene the intent
of the Framers. The Framers could not have conceived of the
situation where an individual residing in multiple states
through property ownership would be selected as a running
mate, putting him or her in conflict with the inhabitancy re-
166. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 499 (1995).
167. DEBATES, supra note 163, at 365.
168. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.




quirement. At the time of ratification, there were no methods of
easy transportation among the states. America had no roads
like modern ones during this period.170 The majority were In-
dian trails and rough pathways with tree stumps in them and
wagon ruts on either side. 171 "Most folks could not afford car-
riages or wagons." 172 "Coastal vessels transported goods and
people along the coasts .... ,173 "Bateau, canoes and rafts were
mainly used in the wilderness .... "174 People traveled mainly
by horse, wagons, coaches and carriages. 175 While some individ-
uals may have possessed a residence in one state and been ab-
sent for durations on public or private business, they likely did
not generally take up residence, in terms of acquiring property
with occasional occupancy, in multiple states. Moreover, one's
attachment to his or her state was likely greater.
Thus, a dilemma presents itself in circumstances where the
candidate, whose status as an inhabitant of a state is in ques-
tion, resides in multiple states. The plain meaning of the term
"inhabitant" is "resident," defined as an individual who physi-
cally dwells in a place or owns real property therein. However,
resident cannot be interpreted broadly where each state of resi-
dency could satisfy the inhabitancy requirement. Such an in-
terpretation would serve to undermine the Framers' desire to
discourage candidates from the same state from running to-
gether. This is because either nominee could claim a second
residence as his place of inhabitancy even though he or she
could be simultaneously serving as an elected official or active
party participant of the same state as his or her running mate.
When a candidate possesses multiple dwellings in which he
or she could claim inhabitancy, the appropriate one for purposes
of the Twelfth Amendment should be determined by looking at
the plain meaning of the text in light of the intent of the Fram-
ers. This means looking at the political activity of the particu-
lar candidate, which may demonstrate the state in which he or
170. Rick Brainard, 18th Century Transportation, 18TH CENTURY HISTORY,
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she may be considered a favorite son by its indigenous political
establishment. This would avoid scenarios where a candidate
would serve in the political establishment of one state while
claiming to be the inhabitant of another in order to run for high
office. It becomes more difficult to ascertain inhabitancy where
the individual in question has never before held public office or
been active in a state's political establishment. Primary place
of residency may be one solution. However, any inquiry should
be made purely on a factual basis.
B. The Application of the Jones Definition
The definition of "inhabitant" adopted by the Jones court
contravenes both the text of the Constitution, and the intent of
the Framers to discourage two candidates arising from the
same state from running together. To illustrate this point, the
following hypothetical delineates the purpose of the Amend-
ment and how the Jones court's interpretation would under-
mine it. Suppose Governor Bush, looking to reach out to female
voters and desiring a running mate with experience in Wash-
ington, had decided to select United States Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison of Texas as his choice for the Republican nomination
for Vice President. The Twelfth Amendment clearly prohibits
such a scenario because both candidates would be "inhabitants"
of Texas under any of the definitions discussed so far. Both own
property in Texas, reside in Texas, and hold public office in
Texas. A Bush-Hutchison ticket would have to forfeit the elec-
toral votes of Texas if they won them in the election. However,
the decision in Jones v. Bush presents a solution to the afore-
mentioned dilemma. Senator Hutchison need only move to
Oklahoma, for example, and declare her intent to reside there
indefinitely. Under this hypothetical let us further assume that
Senator Hutchison's intentions are sincere. She will live in
Oklahoma even if she loses in her bid to become Vice President.
Under the reasoning of the Jones court, Hutchison is now a
domicile of Oklahoma, and an "inhabitant" of Oklahoma to sat-
isfy the Twelfth Amendment. Thus, there are no Constitutional
obstacles to a Bush-Hutchison ticket. The above scenario illus-
trates how the ruling in Jones v. Bush would essentially nullify
the inhabitancy requirement of the Twelfth Amendment, and is




When the candidate possesses residency in more than one
state, then the inquiry should center upon the state in which
that candidate may be considered a favorite son in terms of the
electoral college as the Framers' envisioned, not the definition
adopted by the court in Jones v. Bush. This interpretation effec-
tively breaks up the Kay Bailey Hutchison dilemma discussed
earlier. Even if Senator Hutchison already owned property in
Oklahoma, if she tried to claim Oklahoma residency status for
purposes of the Twelfth Amendment it would fail. Her political
ties would cast her as a favorite son of Texas. This would mean
that officeholders, party leaders and others with strong ties to
the same state as the other candidate on the national ticket
would both still be barred from seeking high office and gaining
their state's electoral votes as the Framers' intended.
To further illustrate this point, the case of former Secretary
of State James Baker is useful to inspect. What if prior to the
Republican National Convention in 1992, Secretary Baker had
changed his voter registration from Texas to Wyoming, where
he owned a fishing cabin, so he could run as President George
Bush's running mate thereby supplanting the incumbent Vice
President, Dan Quayle. Had this scenario played out, Baker
would have been an inhabitant of Texas under the Twelfth
Amendment despite having been a resident of Wyoming simul-
taneously through property ownership as Cheney had been in
2000. The Twelfth Amendment does not allow a candidate to
merely choose among their places of residency in determining
which state a candidate is considered to be an "inhabitant." To
read the language of the Twelfth Amendment in this way would
lead to the same fallacy as interpreting "inhabitant" to be coex-
tensive with "domicile." In other words, we end up right back at
the situation where Kay Bailey Hutchison and George W. Bush
run on the same ticket.
The controlling factor under such circumstances is the po-
litical activity of the candidate. Baker had been a partner in
the Houston law firm Baker and Botts, he had run George
Bush's unsuccessful 1970 campaign for the U.S. Senate seat
from Texas, he had, himself, run for Texas State Attorney Gen-
eral in 1978, and he had continued to own property in Texas
throughout his career in Washington. To find that Secretary
Baker otherwise was not an inhabitant of Texas would be a
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farce. The same would go for Kay Bailey Hutchison, an incum-
bent U.S. Senator elected from Texas, had she run on a ticket
with George W. Bush by claiming inhabitancy in another state.
Another good case would be former Tennessee Senator and Cab-
inet Secretary Bill Brock. He served as a U.S. Senator from
Tennessee, and later ran unsuccessfully for the U.S. Senate
from Maryland in 1988. Had he been selected as a running
mate for a presidential candidate from Maryland, and claimed
to be an inhabitant of Tennessee based upon his prior service in
the U.S. Senate from that state, he would still be considered an
inhabitant of Maryland under the definition of inhabitant in-
tended by the Framers. By seeking elective office from Mary-
land and living in Maryland, he cut his political ties to
Tennessee and became a favorite son of Maryland.
C. Dick Cheney and the Twelfth Amendment
The late Judge Roger B. Andewelt of the United States
Court of Federal Claims was fond of observing that in some in-
stances the correct answer to a legal question may be a 51 to 49
decision. 176 The vice presidential candidacy of Richard Cheney
in the 2000 election is such an instance. With an election in the
balance, Cheney did deserve, and received, the utmost defer-
ence from the courts regarding his candidacy. At the time of the
election, Cheney could be considered a resident of three states:
Virginia, where he owned a home in McLean, Wyoming, and
Texas. By switching his voter registration from Texas to Wyo-
ming, Cheney affirmed that he was seeking the Office of Vice
President as an inhabitant of Wyoming. Based upon the earlier
discussion of the meaning of the term "inhabitant," it does not
matter which state Cheney possessed legal residency under
state law. Under the plain meaning of the term "inhabitant,"
Cheney resided in three states in which he could potentially
claim inhabitancy. The Framers could not have intended for
Cheney to be barred from running for office under three states
because of the intention to bar voting for two favorite sons from
receiving their home state's slate of electors. Circumstances
like those of Cheney were not regularly in existence at the time
176. Telephone Interview with Judge Roger B. Andewelt, U.S. Court of Fed-




of ratification. In order to assess Cheney's status, applying the
definition of inhabitant in light of the intent of the Framers
leads to the conclusion that, for purposes of the Twelfth Amend-
ment, Cheney was an inhabitant of Wyoming, not Texas. Che-
ney served six terms as a House Member from Wyoming, and
continued to own property there after leaving government ser-
vice as Secretary of Defense in 1993. Cheney, just as impor-
tantly, was not involved in Texas state politics, nor had he ever
been.
Under circumstances like Richard Cheney's where a nomi-
nee resides in one state, yet whose political affiliations are with
another, the test becomes which of the two states can he or she
be considered a favorite son. Ultimately, Cheney's running as
an inhabitant of Wyoming did not defeat the purpose behind the
Twelfth Amendment, nor does it contravene the meaning of the
term "inhabitant" as discussed above.
IV. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AND THE
ENFORCEMENT OF THE
TWELFTH AMENDMENT
Judicial review of the qualifications of presidential and vice
presidential candidates as they pertain to the validity of electo-
ral votes comes under the aegis of the Political Question Doc-
trine. Therefore, the issue of whether or not candidates are
"inhabitants" of the same state is not justiciable. It is to be re-
solved by Congress in its capacity as the final arbiter of the elec-
toral vote. Finally, there is no identifiable textual limitation on
the authority of Congress that would deny it the authority to
interpret the meaning of the term "inhabitant" as it pertains to
the certification of electoral votes.
A. The Political Question Doctrine
The Political Question Doctrine's roots lie in Chief Justice
John Marshall's dicta in Marbury v. Madison:177
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of indi-
viduals, not inquire how the executive, or executive officers, per-
form duties in which they have a discretion. Questions, in their
177. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, sub-
mitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. 178
In the subsequent 1849 case of Luther v. Borden, "Chief Justice
John Marshall's Marbury dictum distinguishing political and
legal questions became the basis for an . . . exception to the
scope of ... judicial authority."1 79 The Court would clarify this
exception over the course of subsequent opinions.
The Political Question Doctrine has its origins in the 1849
case Luther v. Borden. 80 The case arose out of circumstances
surrounding an insurrection in Rhode Island that took place in
1841 and 1842.181 Martin Luther brought a claim for trespass
against Luther M. Borden and others in the Circuit Court for
the District of Rhode Island for the breaking and entering of his
home. 8 2 The defendants asserted that they were acting on the
orders of the state pursuant to their military service in order to
control those individuals seeking to overthrow the lawful gov-
ernment of Rhode Island by force, and that Luther was one of
those actively engaged in those efforts. 8 3 The governor placed
the state under martial law in order to deal with the crisis. 84
The defendants' superiors gave them orders to enter Luther's
home and place him under arrest.18 5 They were also given spe-
cific instructions to cause as little damage as possible in their
endeavor. 8 6
The plaintiff called into question the legitimacy of the Gov-
ernment of Rhode Island. 8 7 Prior to the acts of trespass at is-
sue in the case, the lawful Government of Rhode Island was the
one established at the time of the Declaration of Independence,
generally referred to as the "charter government" because, at
the time, it still existed under a 1663 charter from Charles the
Second which had been amended by the state legislature for in-
178. Id. at 170.
179. See J. Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 97, 104 (1988).
180. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (1 How.) 1 (1849).




185. Luther, 48 U.S. (1 How.) at 34.
186. Id.




dependence. 88 Prior to the conflict, many citizens in Rhode Is-
land were displeased with the charter government's restrictions
on suffrage. 8 9 An informal election had taken place in which
delegates were elected to a non-state sanctioned constitutional
convention. 190 The delegates framed a new constitution that ex-
tended the right to vote to all males twenty-one years and
older. 191 Elections took place shortly thereafter to elect state of-
ficials under this new constitution. After the election, the new
constitution was declared ratified and the charter government
null. 192 Thomas W. Dorr, the governor elected under the new
constitution asserted his position by calling upon supporters to
overthrow the charter government. 193 The state declared mar-
tial law and called up the militia to suppress the insurrection. 194
Meanwhile, the charter government, through the 1842 session
of the State Legislature, called a convention to revise its state
charter. 195 A second constitution, this one drafted pursuant to
the orders of the charter government, was promulgated and rat-
ified by the citizens of Rhode Island.196 A new government was
elected under this constitution, and took office in May of
1843.197 The plaintiff argued that he was not part of a general
insurrection against the charter government, but, rather, ac-
tively engaged in supporting the lawful government of Rhode
Island under Thomas Dorr. 198
The Court with Chief Justice Taney writing for the major-
ity took up the issue of whether the government of Rhode Island
had been nullified by the constitution of the dissidents. 199 The
Court observed that to declare the charter government a nullity




190. Luther, 48 U.S. (1 How.) at 35-36.
191. Id. at 36.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 37.
194. Id.
195. Luther, 48 U.S. (1 How.) at 37.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 35.
199. Id. at 38.
200. Luther, 48 U.S. (1 How.) at 38-39.
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For, if this court is authorized to enter upon this inquiry as pro-
posed by the plaintiff, and it should be decided that the charter
government had no legal existence during the period of time
above mentioned, -if it had been annulled by the adoption of the
opposing government, -then the laws passed by its legislature
during that time were nullities; its taxes wrongfully collected; its
salaries and compensation to its officers illegally paid; its public
accounts improperly settled; and the judgments and sentences of
its courts in civil and criminal cases null and void, and the officers
who carried their decisions into operation answerable as trespass-
ers, if not in some cases as criminals. 20 1
Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the "political department
has always determined whether the proposed constitution or
amendment was ratified or not by the people of the State, and
the judicial power has followed its decision."20 2
[T]he Constitution of the United States, as far as it has provided
for an emergency of this kind, and authorized the general govern-
ment to interfere in the domestic concerns of a State, has treated
the subject as political in its nature, and placed the power in the
hands of that department.
The fourth section of the fourth article of the Constitution of
the United States provides that the United States shall guarantee
to every State in the Union a republican form of government, and
shall protect each of them against invasion; and on the applica-
tion of the legislature or of the executive (when the legislature
cannot be convened) against domestic violence.
Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress
to decide what government is the established one in a State. 20 3
It is therefore the role of Congress, the Court reasoned, to de-
cide which is the lawfully established government in a state
before a determination can be made whether that government
is republican. 20 4 The decision of Congress is binding, and can-
not be called into question by the courts. 20 5 Chief Justice Taney
established that " [i]f the judicial power extends so far, the guar-
antee contained in the Constitution of the United States is a
201. Id.
202. Id. at 39.
203. Id. at 42.
204. Id.




guarantee of anarchy, and not of order."20 6 The Court also noted
that "[u]nquestionably a military government, established as
the permanent government of the State, would not be a republi-
can government .. ".. ,207 However, even if a non-republican
form of government came into existence, "it would be the duty of
Congress to overthrow it," not the courts.208
The next major case to address the Political Question Doc-
trine was Colegrove v. Green, a plurality opinion decided in
1946.209 The petitioners in that action were three qualified vot-
ers of Illinois, who resided in Congressional districts with sub-
stantially larger populations than other districts, and sought to
enjoin state officials from conducting an election in 1946 be-
cause the districts "lacked compactness of territory and approxi-
mate equality of population."21 0 The Court reasoned that the
issue was "peculiarly political [in] nature," and, therefore, be-
yond judicial scrutiny.211 Congressional apportionment is rife
with political controversy and strife going all the way back to
Massachusetts Governor Eldridge Gerry (the father and name-
sake of Gerrymandering).21 2 Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the plurality, stated that the "petitioners ask of this Court what
is beyond its competence to grant."21 3 Although the State of Illi-
nois failed to redistrict its Congressional districts in order to
reflect changes in population, Frankfurter reasoned that a court
does not possess the power to draw the maps for new dis-
tricts. 21 4 The most the Court could do was to declare an election
invalid because of the boundaries of the districts. 21 5 The Court
ruled by citing the provision of the Constitution, Article I, Sec-
tion 5, Clause 1, which allows the House to reject a delegation of
Representatives-at-large. 21 6 Article I, Section 4 of the Constitu-
tion further provides that "[t]he Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for ... Representatives, shall be prescribed in
206. Id. at 43.
207. Id. at 45.
208. Id.
209. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
210. Id. at 550-51.
211. Id. at 552.
212. Id. at 554.
213. Id. at 552.
214. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 552-53.
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each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations. '217 The Court
reasoned that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress the
exclusive authority to determine whether the states have ful-
filled their responsibility of providing for fair representation in
the U.S. House of Representatives. 218 If Congress fails to exer-
cise its authority over these matters then the remedy lies with
the voters, not the courts. 219
The decision in Colegrove v. Green was revisited in Baker v.
Carr.220 Justice William Brennan, writing for the majority,
clarified the contours of the Political Question Doctrine. 221 An
action was brought under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988, the
civil rights statutes, to redress the deprivation of Constitutional
rights by a 1901 Tennessee state statute that malapportioned
members of the State General Assembly among the 95 coun-
ties.222 The plaintiffs argued that the districts, as they were
drawn, denied them the equal protection guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment by diluting their votes. 223 The lower
court held that it lacked the subject matter jurisdiction to hear
the case, and further, that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted. 224 The district court,
citing the Court's prior decision in Colegrove v. Green, believed
that the subject matter was nonjusticiable. 225 The Supreme
Court, taking a different view than in Colegrove v. Green, did
not consider the matter to be foreclosed to judicial scrutiny.226
Instead, the Court identified the relevant inquiry as whether
the duty asserted can be identified, its breach judicially deter-
mined, and, in addition, whether protection for the right as-
serted can be upheld. 227 The Court ruled that the doctrine does
not literally preclude from judicial scrutiny all cases involving
217. Id. at 554.
218. Id.
219. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554.
220. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
221. Id.
222. Id. at 187.
223. Id. at 187-88.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 198.
226. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198.




elements of politics.228 Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution
provides that "[tihe judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made
under their Authority .. .. *"229 The Court held that the chal-
lenge to a legislative apportionment "presents no nonjusticiable
'political question."' 230
First, Justice Brennan stated that "the mere fact that a suit
seeks protection of a political right does not mean that it
presents a political question"23' outside of a court's compe-
tence. 232 He distinguished the Guaranty Clause line of cases go-
ing back to Luther v. Borden saying, "that the claim pleaded
here neither rests upon nor implicates the Guaranty Clause and
that its justiciability is therefore not foreclosed by our decisions
of cases involving that clause." 233 The Guaranty Clause cases
involve elements of the Political Question Doctrine, and "for
that reason and no other, they are nonjusticiable."234 Justice
Brennan, commenting on the Court's decision in Luther v. Bor-
den, further stated that:
several factors were thought by the Court in Luther to make the
question there "political": the commitment to the other branches
of the decision as to which is the lawful state government; the
unambiguous action by the President, in recognizing the charter
government as the lawful authority; the need for finality in the
executive's decision; and the lack of criteria by which a court could
determine which form of government was republican. 235
The attributes of the Political Question Doctrine, depend-
ing upon the circumstances, "diverge, combine, appear, and dis-
appear in seeming disorderliness."23 6 "[I]n the Guaranty Clause
cases, and in the other 'political question' cases, it is the rela-
tionship between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of
the Federal Government, and not the federal judiciary's rela-
228. Id. at 209.
229. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
230. Baker, 369 U.S. at 209.
231. Id. at 209.
232. See id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 218.
235. Baker, 369 U.S. at 222.
236. Id. at 210.
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tionship to the States, which gives rise to the 'political ques-
tion."' 237 The nonjusticiability is derived from the separation of
powers on a case-by-case basis. 238 Deciding whether a subject
matter has been committed by the Constitution to a coordinate
branch of government, or whether an action of a branch exceeds
its authority is the proper inquiry. 239 The Political Question
Doctrine serves to maintain order, and should not be applied in
any manner so as "to promote only disorder."240 The doctrine
was described more fully as:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commit-
ment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;
or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determi-
nation of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossi-
bility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a politi-
cal decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question. 241
A subject matter, therefore, constitutes a nonjusticiable "politi-
cal question" when any of these characteristics are present.242
Unless one of them is inextricable from the action in question, it
is nonjusticiable. 243 The question presented in Baker v. Carr
dealt specifically with the consistency of state action with the
provisions of the Constitution.244 Brennan stated that there
were no questions presented by the parties that were more
properly suited for consideration by another branch of govern-
ment.245 Nor in adjudicating the issue did the Court risk em-
barrassing the government abroad, nor would it perpetuate
domestic disturbance at home. 246 Finally, the Court did not
237. Id. at 210.
238. Id. at 210-11.
239. Id. at 211.
240. Baker, 369 U.S. at 215.
241. Id. at 217.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 226.





need to make a policy determination that the issue lacked judi-
cially manageable standards because the Equal Protection
Clause was an appropriate basis for adjudication.247
B. The Political Question Doctrine and Congress
In cases dealing with an enumerated power of Congress,
the Court has generally given great deference to the decisions of
that branch of government. In Coleman v. Miller, decided in
1939, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, writing for the ma-
jority, held that Congress possesses sole authority for deciding
whether a proposed Constitutional amendment has been rati-
fied.248 "In June 1924, the Congress proposed an amendment to
the Constitution, known as the Child Labor Amendment."249 "In
January, 1925, the Legislature of Kansas adopted a resolution
rejecting the proposed amendment and a certified copy of the
resolution was sent to the Secretary of State of the United
States" in Washington. 250 Later, in January 1937, the Kansas
Senate adopted a second resolution this time ratifying the CLA
with the Lieutenant Governor casting the tie breaking vote.251
The Kansas House of Representatives subsequently adopted the
measure. 252 In response, twenty-one members of the Kansas
Senate and three members of the Kansas House challenged the
validity of the resolution in the Kansas Supreme Court to the
effect that the Lieutenant Governor improperly cast his vote for
the CLA.253 They also asserted that the amendment, having not
been ratified by the requisite number of states from 1924 to
1927, had not been ratified within a reasonable time with the
time for Kansas to ratify it expired.254 The Kansas Supreme
Court held that the Lieutenant Governor could cast the decid-
ing vote, and, therefore, the adoption of the resolution in the
Kansas Senate was proper.255
247. Id.
248. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 454 (1939).
249. Id. at 435.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 435-36.
252. Id. at 436.
253. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 435-36.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 437.
252 [Vol. 23:213
40https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol23/iss1/5
THAT DOG DON'T HUNT
The U.S. Supreme Court, on appeal, held that the efficacy
of ratifications by state legislatures should be regarded as a po-
litical question with the ultimate authority resting with Con-
gress in its exercise of control over the adoption of
amendments. 256 The Court cited as historical precedents the
New Jersey Legislature's initial rejection of the Thirteenth
Amendment in 1865 and its later ratification and acceptance by
Congress.257 The Court also pointed out that in 1866, the legis-
latures of Georgia, North Carolina and South Carolina initially
rejected the Fourteenth Amendment but then adopted it, after a
change in the composition of the government. 258 Congress ac-
cepted the second votes and counted them as part of three
fourths needed for ratification. 259 The Court observed that the
"more serious question is whether the proposal by the Congress
of the amendment had lost its vitality through lapse of time and
hence it could not be ratified by the Kansas legislature in
1937."260 Congress in proposing an amendment possesses the
power to fix a reasonable time frame for ratification by the
states. 261 In Dillon v. Gloss, the Court "sustained the action of
the Congress in providing in the proposed Eighteenth Amend-
ment that it should be inoperative unless ratified within seven
years."262 The petitioners in Coleman v. Miller argued that, in
the absence of a limitation placed by Congress, the Court should
infer a reasonable time for ratification. 263 The Court explicitly
rejected this line of reasoning stating that there are no criteria
for judicial determination anywhere in the Constitution for de-
termining what is a reasonable time for ratification. 264 The
Court noted "[O]ur decision that the Congress has the power
under Article V to fix a reasonable limit of time for ratification
in proposing an amendment proceeds upon the assumption that
256. Id. at 449.
257. Id. at 448.
258. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 448.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 451.
261. Id. at 452 (citing Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921)).
262. Id.
263. Coleman, 307 U.S. at 452.




the question, what is a reasonable time, lies within the congres-
sional province." 265
The Court has also, in some instances, recognized the limits
of Congressional power in addressing otherwise political mat-
ters related to that body. In Powell v. McCormack, a 1969 deci-
sion authored by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Adam Clayton
Powell, after having been elected to serve in the House of Repre-
sentatives for the 90th Congress, was denied his seat through
the adoption of House Resolution No. 278, which the Speaker
ruled would exclude Powell from the House Chamber. 266 The
House had taken action upon learning of charges that Powell
had misappropriated public funds, and abused the processes of
the New York courts. 267 The House adopted the Resolution by a
vote of 248 to 176.268
In 1966, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. was re-elected to the
House from the 18th Congressional District in Harlem, New
York. 269 "During the 89th Congress, a Special Subcommittee on
Contracts of the Committee on House Administration conducted
an investigation into the expenditures of the Committee on Ed-
ucation and Labor, of which [Powell served as] chairman."270 A
report concluded "that Powell and certain staff employees had
deceived the House authorities as to travel expenses."
271
"Strong evidence that certain illegal salary payments had been
made to Powell's wife at his direction" also was included in the
report. 272 Powell filed suit, arguing that the Resolution barred
his seating in violation of Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the
Constitution, contrary to the mandate that House members be
elected by the people of each State, and contrary to Clause 2
which sets forth the qualifications for membership to the House
of age, citizenship, and residence. 273 The Court's examination of
the relevant historical precedents led it to conclude that Powell
was correct in that the Constitution leaves the House without
265. Id. at 454.
266. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 492-93 (1969).
267. See id. at 489-90.
268. Id. at 493.
269. Id. at 489.
270. Id. at 489-90.
271. Powell, 395 U.S. at 490.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 486.
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authority to exclude any person elected by his constituents who
meets the enumerated requirements for election in Article 11.274
The Framers' understood that "the qualifications for members
of Congress had been fixed in the Constitution."275 For almost
the first 100 years of its existence, "[C]ongress strictly limited
its power to judge the qualifications of its members to those
enumerated in the Constitution."276 In 1807, "the eligibility of
William McCreery was challenged, because he did not meet ad-
ditional residency requirements imposed by the State of Mary-
land."277 "[I]n recommending that he be seated, the House
Committee of Elections reasoned: ... Qualifications of members
are therein determined, without reserving any authority to the
State Legislatures to change, add to, or diminish those qualifi-
cations; and that, by that instrument, Congress is constituted
the sole judge of the qualifications prescribed by it, and are
obliged to decide agreeably .... ,,,278
In 1868, the House voted to exclude two members-elect be-
cause they had given aid and comfort to the Confederacy.
27 9
Since that case Congressional practice had been erratic.280
Whether any of these examples serve as precedent, the Court
noted "[that an unconstitutional action has been taken before
surely does not render that same action any less unconstitu-
tional at a later date."28 ' The Court held "that Art. I, § 5, is at
most a 'textually demonstrable commitment' to Congress to
judge only the qualifications expressly set forth," therefore, the
issue is justiciable.282 The House asserted that its power to "be
the Judge on the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its
own Members" was a textual commitment of unreviewable au-
thority.283 However, this interpretation is defeated by the exis-
tence of a separate provision enumerating the specific
qualifications for House membership. The decision as to
274. Id. at 522.
275. Id. at 540.
276. Powell, 395 U.S. at 542.
277. Id.
278. Id. (quoting 17 ANNALS OF CONG. 871 (1807)).
279. Id. at 544.
280. Id. at 544-45.
281. Powell, 395 U.S. at 546-47.
282. Id. at 548.




whether a Member satisfied these qualifications was placed
with the House, but the decision as to of what these qualifica-
tions consisted was not. The holding was based on the fixed
meaning of "qualifications" set forth in Article I, Section 2.
However, in Nixon v. United States, a 1993 opinion by Chief
Justice William Rehnquist, the Court distinguished its holding
in Powell v. McCormack.28 4 Walter L. Nixon, Jr., a former fed-
eral judge removed from office by Congress pursuant to the Im-
peachment Clause of the Constitution, petitioned the Supreme
Court to review "whether Senate Rule XI, which allows a com-
mittee of Senators to hear evidence against an individual who
has been impeached and to report that evidence to the full Sen-
ate," violates Article I, Section 3, Clause 6 of the Constitution.2 5
The Impeachment Clause states that the "Senate shall have the
sole power to try all Impeachments."28 6 "Nixon, a former Chief
Judge of the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Mississippi, was convicted by a jury of two counts of
making false statements before a federal grand jury and sen-
tenced to prison."28 7 "On May 10, 1989, the House of Represent-
atives adopted three Articles of Impeachment" against Nixon. 288
The Senate soon thereafter "voted to invoke its Impeachment
Rule XI, under which the presiding officer appoints a committee
of Senators to 'receive evidence and take testimony.' 28 9 The
Senate then voted as a whole by more than the required two-
thirds needed to convict Nixon on the first two articles. 290
The Court ruled that "the concept of a textual commitment
to a coordinate political department is not completely separate
from the concept of a lack of judicially discoverable and man-
ageable standards."291 A "lack of judicially manageable stan-
dards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually
demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch."292 Under
Article I, Section 3, Clause 6, which determines "the scope of
284. Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
285. Id. at 226.
286. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
287. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 226.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 227.
290. Id. at 228.
291. Id. at 227-28.
292. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 228-29.
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authority conferred upon the Senate" by the Constitution re-
garding the impeachment of federal judges, Nixon argued "that
the word 'try' in the first sentence imposes by implication an
additional requirement" that any proceedings undertaken by
the Senate must be in the form of a judicial trial.293 Unlike the
case in Powell v. McCormack, "there is no separate provision of
the Constitution that could be defeated by allowing the Senate
final authority to determine the meaning of the word 'try' in the
Impeachment Trial Clause."294 The Court concluded, "that the
word 'try' in the Impeachment Trial Clause does not provide an
identifiable textual limit on the authority" of the Senate. 295
C. Congressional Procedures and Precedents in Resolving
Disputed Electoral Votes
The authority to count the electoral votes and adjudicate
disputes is placed in the hands of a coordinate political depart-
ment by the Constitution. The Constitution authorizes the
President of the Senate to count the electoral votes during a
joint session of Congress, and any disputes that may arise as to
the validity of those votes is given to Congress to resolve.296 Ar-
ticle II, Section 1, states, in part:
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by
Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhab-
itant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a
List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for
each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed
to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to
the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in
the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all
the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted.297
Through 3 U.S.C. § 15, Congress has the authority to certify
electoral votes, and interpret the meaning of "inhabitant" as the
issue may arise during the certification process. Congress pos-
sesses this power under the statute pursuant to the Necessary
and Proper Clause. Article I, section 8 states that Congress has
293. Id. at 229.
294. Id. at 237.
295. See id. at 238.





the power "[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."298
There is ample legislative precedent for resolving disputes con-
cerning the validity of ballots cast in the electoral college.
The procedure for counting the electoral votes and resolv-
ing any objections to their validity during a joint session of Con-
gress is laid out in 3 U.S.C. § 15:
Congress shall be in session on the sixth day of January suc-
ceeding every meeting of the electors. The Senate and House of
Representatives shall meet in the Hall of the House of Represent-
atives at the hour of 1 o'clock in the afternoon on that day, and the
President of the Senate shall be their presiding officer. Two tell-
ers shall be previously appointed on the part of the Senate and
two on the part of the House of Representatives, to whom shall be
handed, as they are opened by the President of the Senate, all the
certificates and papers purporting to be certificates of the electo-
ral votes, which certificates and papers shall be opened,
presented, and acted upon in the alphabetical order of the States,
beginning with the letter A; and said tellers, having then read the
same in the presence and hearing of the two Houses, shall make a
list of the votes as they shall appear from the said certificates;
and the votes having been ascertained and counted according to
the rules in this subchapter provided, the result of the same shall
be delivered to the President of the Senate, who shall thereupon
announce the state of the vote, which announcement shall be
deemed a sufficient declaration of the persons, if any, elected
President and Vice President of the United States, and, together
with a list of the votes, be entered on the Journals of the two
Houses. Upon such reading of any such certificate or paper, the
President of the Senate shall call for objections, if any. Every ob-
jection shall be made in writing, and shall state clearly and con-
cisely, and without argument, the ground thereof, and shall be
signed by at least one Senator and one Member of the House of
Representatives before the same shall be received. When all objec-
tions so made to any vote or paper from a State shall have been
received and read, the Senate shall thereupon withdraw, and
such objections shall be submitted to the Senate for its decision;
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, in like
298. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.
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manner, submit such objections to the House of Representatives
for its decision; and no electoral vote or votes from any State
which shall have been regularly given by electors whose appoint-
ment has been lawfully certified to according to section 6 of this
title from which but one return has been received shall be re-
jected, but the two Houses concurrently may reject the vote or
votes when they agree that such vote or votes have not been so
regularly given by electors whose appointment has been so certi-
fied. If more than one return or paper purporting to be a return
from a State shall have been received by the President of the Sen-
ate, those votes, and those only, shall be counted which shall have
been regularly given by the electors who are shown by the deter-
mination mentioned in section 5 of this title to have been ap-
pointed, if the determination in said section provided for shall
have been made, or by such successors or substitutes, in case of a
vacancy in the board of electors so ascertained, as have been ap-
pointed to fill such vacancy in the mode provided by the laws of
the State; but in case there shall arise the question which of two
or more of such State authorities determining what electors have
been appointed, as mentioned in section 5 of this title, is the law-
ful tribunal of such State, the votes regularly given of those elec-
tors, and those only, of such State shall be counted whose title as
electors the two Houses, acting separately, shall concurrently de-
cide is supported by the decision of such State so authorized by its
law; and in such case of more than one return or paper purporting
to be a return from a State, if there shall have been no such deter-
mination of the question in the State aforesaid, then those votes,
and those only, shall be counted which the two Houses shall con-
currently decide were cast by lawful electors appointed in accor-
dance with the laws of the State, unless the two Houses, acting
separately, shall concurrently decide such votes not to be the law-
ful votes of the legally appointed electors of such State. But if the
two Houses shall disagree in respect of the counting of such votes,
then, and in that case, the votes of the electors whose appoint-
ment shall have been certified by the executive of the State, under
the seal thereof, shall be counted. When the two Houses have
voted, they shall immediately again meet, and the presiding of-
ficer shall then announce the decision of the questions submitted.
No votes or papers from any other State shall be acted upon until
the objections previously made to the votes or papers from any
State shall have been finally disposed of.
299




The grounds for an objection are that the vote was not "regu-
larly given" by an elector, or that the elector was not legally
certified under the state's procedures. Title 3 U.S.C. section 15
states: "no electoral vote ... regularly given by electors whose
appointment has been . . . received shall be rejected."300 Any
objection to the validity of an electoral vote or votes "shall state
clearly and concisely, and without argument, the ground
thereof ..,, "301 At least one Senator and one Member of the
House must sign a written objection. 30 2 Upon receipt of an ob-
jection, the joint session goes into recess, and each chamber de-
liberates separately over the objection. 30 3 Debate is limited to
two hours.30 4 During debate, each Senator and Representative
may speak for or against the objection for no more than five
minutes, and may not address the chamber more than once. 305
After the close of debate, each chamber votes separately
whether or not to uphold the objection.306 After the two cham-
bers have voted, they immediately reconvene in joint session,
and the President of the Senate announces the results.30 7 In
order to sustain an objection, both chambers must vote to up-
hold. 30 If the two chambers do not agree then the objection
falls and the votes are counted. 30 9 Also, under the statute, "[n]o
votes or papers from any other State shall be acted upon until
the objections previously made to the votes or papers from any
State shall have been finally disposed of" 310 These procedures
were invoked in 1969, the only time since their enactment in
1887 when this has occurred, when a Representative and a Sen-
ator objected to the vote of an elector from North Carolina who
had cast his votes for Governor George Wallace for President
and General Curtis E. LeMay for Vice President, the nominees
of the American Independent Party. 311
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. DESCHLER, supra note 36, Ch. 10, § 1.
303. Id.
304. 3 U.S.C. § 17 (2002).
305. Id.





311. DESCHLER, supra note 36, Ch. 10, § 3.6.
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On January 6, 1969, Representative James G. O'Hara of
Michigan and Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine objected to
votes cast by a North Carolina elector for George Wallace for
President and Curtis LeMay for Vice President respectively. 312
The vote of North Carolina was stated to be twelve for Richard
M. Nixon and Spiro T. Agnew for President and Vice President
respectively, and one for George Wallace and Curtis LeMay for
President and Vice President respectively.313 The objection
stated:
We object to the votes from the State of North Carolina for
George C. Wallace for President and for Curtis E. LeMay for Vice
President on the ground that they were not regularly given in
that the plurality of votes of the people of North Carolina were
cast for Richard M. Nixon for President and for Spiro T. Agnew for
Vice President and the State thereby appointed thirteen electors
to vote for Richard M. Nixon for President and for Spiro T. Agnew
for Vice President and appointed no electors to vote for any other
persons. Therefore, no electoral vote of North Carolina should be
counted for George C. Wallace for President or for Curtis E. Le-
May for Vice President.
JAMES G. O'HARA, M.C.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, U.S.S.3 14
After the President of the Senate concluded that the objection
was filed in accordance with law, the joint session recessed in
order for the two chambers to separately consider the objec-
tion.315 The legal basis for the objection was based on 3 USC
§ 15, which states:
[A]nd no electoral vote or votes from any State which shall have
been regularly given by electors whose appointment has been law-
fully certified to according to section 6 of this title from which but
one return has been received shall be rejected, but the two Houses
concurrently may reject the vote or votes when they agree that
such vote or votes have not been so regularly given by electors
whose appointment has been so certified.316
"Those supporting the objection in the House and Senate con-
tended that the votes of one North Carolina elector had not been
312. Id.
313. Id. § 3.6.
314. 115 CONG. REC. 146 (1969).
315. DESCHLER, supra note 36, Ch. 10, § 3.6.




'regularly given' and should therefore be rejected. '3 17 Senator
Muskie eloquently stated this position during the Senate
debate:
In this case, a North Carolina elector was nominated as an
elector by a district convention of the Republican Party in North
Carolina. He did not reject that nomination. His name was not
placed on the ballot because under North Carolina law, as in the
case of 34 other States, only the names of the party's presidential
and vice-presidential candidates appear, and electors are elected
for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates receiving the
plurality of the vote in North Carolina.
Dr. Bailey and 12 other North Carolina Republican electors
were so elected on November 5. The election was certified. Dr.
Bailey did not reject that election or that certification. So up to
that moment, so far as the people from North Carolina under-
stood, he was committed as an elector on the Republican slate,
riding under the names of Richard M. Nixon and Spiro T. Agnew,
to vote for that presidential and vice-presidential ticket.
On December 16, the electors of North Carolina met in Ra-
leigh to cast their votes .... It was at that point that Dr. Bailey
decided to cast his vote for the Wallace-LeMay ticket instead ....
[A]s I understand it, the Constitution, as interpreted by the
debates in the Constitutional Convention, clearly makes an elec-
tor a free agent. However, from the beginning of the country's
history, political parties developed, and political parties arranged
for slates of electors assigned to their presidential and vice-presi-
dential candidates. That political party slate of candidates has
always been regarded, with but five other exceptions, as binding
upon those who are electors on that slate.
So I argue that in light of that tradition, when an elector
chooses to go on a party slate, he is indicating his choice for
President.
I say, secondly, that in the case of North Carolina and this
statute, which is found also in 34 other States, the fact that only
the presidential and vice-presidential names appear on the ballot
is confirmation of this tradition; that when an elector accepts a
place on a slate under these circumstances, in the light of this
tradition, he knows that to the public at large he is saying, by his
action, "I am for Nixon for President." He is saying implicitly, in
my judgement, "If I am elected an elector under these circum-
stances, I will vote for Richard Nixon for President."
317. DESCHLER, supra note 36, Ch. 10, § 3.6.
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I believe that is the tradition. I believe that this undergirds
the responsibility of an elector; and once he has set that train of
understanding in motion, he cannot, after election day, when it is
too late for the voters to respond to any change of mind on his
part, say, "I changed my mind, and I am going to vote for some-
body else." It is in the nature of estoppel. 318
Those supporting the objection argued that the elector in ques-
tion possessed, in the least, a moral commitment to vote for the
Republican ticket to which he had pledged his support.319 Con-
gressional members considered this argument compelling in
light of custom and practice since the ratification of the Consti-
tution with electors casting their votes for whom they were
pledged, and the reliance by the voters of North Carolina upon
the elector's explicit intentions.320
"[T]hose opposed to the objection argued that the electors
were free agents" permitted to vote their conscience under the
Constitution. 321 Under title 3 U.S.C. section 15, Congress only
possesses an administrative role in counting the votes, and can-
not reject them unless they were not regularly cast or authen-
tic. 322 In support of this position, it was noted that North
Carolina had not adopted a law like other states to explicitly
bind its electors. 323 Senator Edward M. Brooke of Massachu-
setts said:
In a system of constitutional government matters of proce-
dure often become vital issues of substance. I submit that such a
case is now before us. There are strong constitutional grounds for
the authority of a State to bind its electors to vote as they are
pledged. If a State has so bound its electors, I would contend that
Congress can properly act to see that State's legal requirements
are fulfilled. This would be a reasonable construction of the 1887
statute which provides that Congress can reject an elector's vote
which has not been regularly given.
But it is my considered opinion that, unless the State chooses
to bind its electors, Congress cannot do so after the fact.
318. 115 CONG. REC. 211-12 (1969).
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Among the many serious implications of this situation, one
lesson in particular stands out:
No official should ever be granted discretionary authority un-
less the people clearly understand that, under some circum-
stances, he may actually use it. And if such authority, once
granted, is deemed excessive or unwise, the people should explic-
itly and promptly rescind it.
As I understand the relevant constitutional guidelines, the
power to remedy this particular problem lies with the people of
North Carolina acting through their representative institutions at
the State level ....
In addition, however, there is a national interest in removing
so critical a loophole in our constitutional system. If the electoral
college is to remain an element in our political life, surely we
should move to design a constitutional amendment which, once
and for all, binds electors to vote for the candidates to whom they
are pledged. I hasten to add that this possible change in our elec-
toral system will certainly not suffice. Indeed, one of the para-
mount tasks of this Congress will be to examine the full range of
constitutional proposals to create a fair and secure procedure for
presidential elections .324
As further support for this position, the Supreme Court decision
in Ray v. Blair,325 which upheld state laws binding electors, was
cited as persuasive. 326 After debate, the House and Senate both
voted to strike the objection. 327
Another relatively recent electoral vote dispute was settled
by Congress under these procedures where the certificates of
electoral votes had been received from different slates of elec-
tors from Hawaii, and each slate purported to be the one duly
appointed.328 On January 6, 1961, the President of the Senate,
Richard Nixon, handed the tellers the certificates of electoral
votes from two different slates of electors from the State of Ha-
waii. 329 "A recount of ballots in Hawaii, which was concluded
after the Governor of that state had certified the election of the
Republican slate of electors, threw that state into the Demo-
cratic column; the Governor then sent a second communication
324. 115 CONG. REC. 213 (1969).
325. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
326. DESCHLER, supra note 36, Ch. 10, § 3.6.
327. Id.
328. Id. Ch. 10, § 1.2.
329. 107 CONG. REC. 288-91 (1961).
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to the Administrator of General Services which certified that
the Democratic slate of electors had been lawfully appointed." 330
However, "[b]oth slates of electors met on the day prescribed by
law, cast their votes, and submitted them to the President of the
Senate."331 The incident occurred as follows:
THE VICE PRESIDENT: ... The Chair has knowledge, and
is convinced that he is supported by the facts, that the certificate
from the Honorable William F. Quinn, Governor of the State of
Hawaii, dated January 4, 1961, received by the Administrator of
General Services on January 6, 1961, and transmitted to the Sen-
ate and the House of Representatives on January 6, 1961, being
Executive Communication Number 215 of the House of Repre-
sentatives, properly and legally portrays the facts with respect to
the elctors chosen by the people of Hawaii at the election for Pres-
ident and Vice President held on November 8, 1960. As read from
the certificates, William H. Heen, Delbert E. Metzger, and Jennie
Wilson were appointed as electors of President and Vice President
held on November 8, 1960, and did on the first Monday after the
second Wednesday of December, 1960, cast their votes for John F.
Kennedy of Massachusetts for President and Lyndon B. Johnson
of Texas for Vice President.
In order not to delay the further count of the electoral vote
here, the Chair, without the intent of establishing a precedent,
suggests that the electors named in the certificate of the Governor
of Hawaii dated January 4, 1961, be considered as the lawful elec-
tors from the State of Hawaii.
If there be no objection in this joint convention, the Chair will
instruct the tellers - and he now does - to count the votes of those
electors named in the certificate of the Governor of Hawaii dated
January 4, 1961 - those votes having been cast for John F. Ken-
nedy, of Massachusetts, for President and Lyndon B. Johnson, of
Texas, for Vice President.
Without objection the tellers will accordingly count the votes
of those electors named in the certificate of the Governor of Ha-
waii dated January 4, 1961.
There was no objection.
The tellers then proceeded to read, count and announce the
electoral votes of the remaining States in alphabetical order. 332
330. Id.
331. DESCHLER, supra note 36, Ch. 10, § 3.5.




"Without objection, the Chair instructed the tellers to count the
votes of those electors named in the certificate of the Governor
of Hawaii dated January 4, 1961."333 As binding precedent
thereafter, "[tihe two Houses, meeting in joint session to count
the electoral votes, may by unanimous consent decide which of
two conflicting electoral certificates from a state is valid; and
the tellers are then directed to count the electoral votes in the
certificate deemed valid."334
Thus, Congress has the power under the Constitution to
certify the electoral votes, and resolve any disputes that may
arise thereunder. Pursuant to its authority, Congress has en-
acted rules and procedures to make objections to the validity of
electoral votes, and to deliberate upon any objections. Congres-
sional precedents have been established to resolve these dis-
putes and upon what grounds. While court decisions are often
persuasive in debate, Congress has retained the authority to
rule on the actual vote or votes in question in its capacity as the
certifier of the electoral votes.
D. The Political Question Doctrine Applied to the Twelfth
Amendment
Congress possesses the authority, under the Constitution,
to bear witness as the President of the Senate counts the votes,
and certify the results by resolving any disputes that may arise.
Pursuant to its authority, Congress has established procedures
to resolve disputes over the validity of votes cast in the electoral
college. The appropriate procedure by which to contest the va-
lidity of a state's votes when both candidates may be inhabi-
tants of the same state is for a member of Congress to bring
forth an objection, which must be seconded by a colleague, dur-
ing special session. Should a court rule on the issue of whether
two candidates are inhabitants of the same state, thereby vali-
dating or invalidating a state's electoral votes, the ruling could
potentially countermand the authority of Congress to make
such a finding. A court does not possess the intrinsic authority
to certify electoral votes. That authority has been committed to
Congress by the Constitution. Also, there is no separate provi-
333. DESCHLER, supra note 36, Ch. 10, § 1.2.
334. Id. Ch. 10, § 3.5.
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sion of the Constitution that would be undermined by allowing
Congress to interpret the meaning of the term "inhabitant" in
the Twelfth Amendment pursuant to its power to certify the
electoral votes. Moreover, multifarious pronouncements on the
meaning of the term and the validity of electoral votes certified
thereunder can only lead to confusion and embarrassment on
the part of the Government. Therefore, a court should refrain
from issuing a declaration on the status of a candidate as an
inhabitant of a state pursuant to the Political Question Doc-
trine. Should Congress so blatantly certify the electoral votes
for presidential and vice presidential candidates who are with-
out question inhabitants of the same state, then the resolution
of such actions lies with the electorate in selecting their future
representation.
Factors which a court may weigh in ascertaining whether
an action by a coordinate branch of government arises under
the Political Question Doctrine include whether the matter has
been committed by the Constitution to a coordinate branch of
government, the impossibility of a court to undertake an inde-
pendent resolution and still give due respect accorded to an-
other branch, the necessity to adhere to a political decision
already made, and the potential for embarrassment arising
from counter proclamations made by co-equal branches of
government.
These criteria are inextricable from a case where a court
issues a ruling as to whether two candidates standing for Presi-
dent and Vice President can be considered "inhabitants" of the
same state for purposes of the Twelfth Amendment. The deci-
sion regarding inhabitancy is placed by the Constitution with
Congress in its capacity as the certifier of electoral votes. Given
the strict deadlines in which the electoral college meets and
Congress certifies the results, the text does not provide for the
courts to play an extended role in the process. With expedited
proceedings, a court may make some rulings to clarify aspects of
the electoral process, but practical difficulties would result if a
court either ruled counter to a decision by Congress, or at-
tempted to bind Congress to a decision in which it is its preroga-
tive to make. Furthermore, any interdiction in the certification




Framers to have as expeditious as possible the election of the
Executive.
One of the main purposes behind the Political Question
Doctrine is the maintenance of government order. This ratio-
nale underlies all of the enumerated factors for assessing
whether an issue before a court is justiciable. Much in the way
multiple pronouncements by Congress and the Supreme Court
over the impeachment of a federal judge or the President would
result in confusion, so too would differing rulings on the legiti-
macy of electoral votes cast also promote disorder. In a case
such as the 2000 election, Should a court ruling result in the
forfeiture of electoral votes? What would be the remedy if they
were already cast and certified? While individual members of
Congress would no doubt take a court ruling into consideration
in deliberating upon whether to challenge a slate of electoral
votes on the grounds they were cast for two candidates who are
both inhabitants of that state, there is no provision in the Con-
stitution to review the decision of Congress. Should a court rule
otherwise, two different interpretations of "inhabitant" made by
co-equal branches of government would result in confusion.
There is nothing to say that the interpretation made by one or
the other is somehow illegitimate. Therefore, a pronouncement
by a court as to the inability of a ticket to receive the electoral
votes of a state as per the requirements of the Twelfth Amend-
ment could only result in confusion or embarrassment should
Congress disagree and certify those electoral votes under
scrutiny.
Next, the decision of whether two candidates are both "in-
habitants" of the same state is textually committed to the legis-
lative branch in its capacity as the certifier of the electoral
votes. The Constitution grants the power to determine the
method of selection for electors to the state legislatures, sets the
timetable for the electoral college to meet, and provides for the
President of the Senate to count the votes before a joint session
of Congress. The entire process is placed in the hands of the
political branches of government. Most importantly, it is left to
Congress to count and certify the votes, and for Congress to hold
a contingent election should no candidate receive a majority in
the electoral college. There is no provision for the courts to re-
view the decisions made by Congress in counting the votes.
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This is consistent with what the Framers intended. The process
of selecting the chief executive should be as swift as possible.
One source for the intentional expediency of elections is Alexis
de Toqueville's seminal work Democracy in America. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor has described de Tocqueville as a "per-
ceptive commentator on our country."335 The Supreme Court
also has cited the observations of de Tocqueville as support in
some of its opinions. 33 6 As de Toqueville noted with regard to
the framers choosing an electoral system that would attempt to
elect the executive with as little delay as possible:
As it had been noticed that assemblies responsible for choosing
heads of government in countries with elective systems inevitably
became centers of passion and of intrigue, that they sometimes
took over powers not belonging to them, and that often their pro-
ceedings, with the uncertainty resulting therefrom, could drag on
so long that they put the state in danger - for all these reasons it
was settled that all the electors should vote on a fixed day, but
without assembling together.
•.. [I]t was arranged that the votes should be sent under seal
to the president of the Senate; he was to break the seals on the
appointed day in the presence of the two houses. If none of the
candidates had obtained a majority, then the House of Represent-
atives itself was to proceed immediately to elect a President
337
Finally, there is no textual conflict between the Twelfth
Amendment and any other provision of the Constitution that
would prevent Congress from making a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the term "inhabitant." In Powell v. McCormack, the Su-
preme Court held that Congress can only judge those
qualifications set forth in the Constitution in deliberating
whether someone is qualified to be sworn into office. 338 Chief
Justice William Rehnquist in Nixon v. United States clarified
the Court's earlier decision in Powell by ruling that no separate
335. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 143 (1986) (Burger, J., dissenting).
336. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 710-11
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 75-78 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
337. ALEXIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 121 (George Lawrence
trans., J.P. Mayer ed.) (1966).




provision of the Constitution could be defeated through the Sen-
ate's authority to interpret the meaning of the word "try" in the
Impeachment Clause. The same reasoning applies to the au-
thority of a joint session of Congress to interpret the term "in-
habitant." To allow Congress to define the term would not
contradict any other provision. Thus, the interpretation of the
term "inhabitant" is textually committed to Congress as the cer-
tifier of the electoral votes, and there is no other provision of the
Constitution that would aid in leading to a conclusion
otherwise.
V. CONCLUSION
The ruling by the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Texas in Jones v. Bush that the term "inhabitant" in the
Twelfth Amendment is coextensive with the concept of domicile
in civil procedure is contrary to both the text of the Constitution
and the intent of the Framers. The term "inhabitant" means an
individual who physically resides or owns real property in a
given state. Under circumstances where a candidate resides in
more than one state, the place of inhabitancy should be deter-
mined in light of the Framers' intentions to deter two candi-
dates from the same state from seeking high office together.
This generally means that the candidates' participation in state
politics will often be the determining factor in deriving an indi-
vidual's place of inhabitancy for purposes of the Twelfth
Amendment. Finally, the process of counting and certifying the
electoral votes cast is committed to Congress by the Constitu-
tion with the President of the Senate conducting the actual
count. The interpretation of the term "inhabitant" as it arises
under this provision is for Congress to decide. A court should
refrain from a pronouncement on such an issue under the Politi-
cal Question Doctrine.
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